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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-CAPACITY To COMMIT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CRIME-THE COMMON LAW DEFENSE OF LACK OF MENS REA; A
HEROIN ADDICT'S DEFENSE To POSSESSION OF HEROIN.
Lavern Gorham was charged with the unlawful possession of
heroin' and the unlawful possession of heroin paraphernalia. 2  Gor-
ham attempted to raise as an affirmative defenses the common law
defense of lack of criminal responsibility-mens rea 4 -due to heroin
addiction5 for her possession of heroin and heroin paraphernalia for
personal use.8 The trial court did not allow Gorham to develop evi-
dence in support of the defense because the defense was not brought
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-402(a) (1973). This statute prohibits the possession of nar-
cotic drugs.
The statute is not a strict liability statute; rather, it requires knowing possession
of a narcotic drug. United States v. Weaver, 458 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The United States Congress is the law maker for the District of Columbia. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1601 (1973). This statute prohibits the possession of imple-
ments of crime.
This statute is also not a strict liability statute; proof of criminal intent is needed.
Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
3. The appellant did not raise as a defense the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. The court considered this issue disposed of in Wheeler v. United
States, 276. A.2d 722 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 403 &
n.8 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
4. Mens rea is defined as: "A guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal
intent." BLAcKS LAw DierIoNARY 1137 (4th ed. 1968). See generally notes 14-22 and ac-
companyIng text infra.
5. Congress has statutorily defined a "drug addict" as:
[A]ny individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger
the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the
use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference
to his addiction.
21 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
This is also the same definition the District of Columbia uses for "drug user." D.C
CODE ANN. § 24-602(a) (1973). Perhaps the most cited definition of a drug addict is that
of the World Health Organization, which lists the following as characteristic of heroin ad-
diction:
(1) an overpowering desire or need to continue taking the drug and to obtain
It by any means; the need can be satisfied by the drug taken initially or by
another with morphine-like properties;
(2) a tendency to increase the dose owing to the development of tolerance;
(3) a psychic dependence on the effects of the drug related, to a subjective
and individual appreciation of those effects; and
(4) a physical dependence on the effects of the drug requiring its presence
for maintenance of homeostasis and resulting in a definite, characteristic,
and self-limited abstinance syndrome when the drug is withdrawn.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ExPERT COMMITTEE ON ADDICTION-PRODUCING DRUGS 13
(World Health Organization Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 273 at 13, 1964), as cited in United States
v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, Bazelon, Tamm, and Robin-
son, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
6. The basic issue dealt with by the court was whether a non-trafficking addict charged
with possession of heroin and heroin paraphernalia has the requisite mens rea to be con-
victed of a crime that requires a mental element to be present. Gorham v. United States,
339 A.2d 401, 403, 432 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
ET~he affirmative defense, if recognized, would be available to the addict
who is guilty of the type of illegal activity which is inherent in the disease
of heroin addiction-purchase, possession, use of heroin, and the parapher-
nalia to prepare and inject it. The defendant woud have to convince the
trier of fact of the existence of the lack of capacity and the causal relation
between the lack of capacity and the action in question.
Brief for Appellants Gorham and Williams at 38, Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401
(D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
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within the format required for an insanity defense.7 Gorham was
convicted of possession of heroin and heroin paraphernalia and ap-
pealed." The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the
intent of Congress, indicated by the lack of a specific exemption of
addicts from the possession laws, 9 and a statutory provision for
treatment of addicts, 0 placed recognition of the defense beyond the
court's authority. The court also ruled that even if it possessed such
authority, it would not be disposed to recognize the defense because
of the injury to society that is caused by addicts,": and because of
the existence of provisions for discretionary probation and treat-
ment 12 which render the existing method of handling addicts con-
7. Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 404, 427 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975). The insanity
defense available in the District of Columbia is defined in United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972):
The first component of our rule . . . defines mental disease or defect as
an abnormal condition of the mind, and a condition which substantially (a)
affects mental or emotional processes and (b) impairs behavioral controls. The
second component, derived from the Model Penal Code, tells which defendant
with a mental disease lacks criminal responsibility for particular conduct:
it is the defendant who, as a result of this mental condition, at the time of
such conduct, either (I) lacks substantial capacity to appreciate that his con-
duct is wrongful, or (ii) lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the law.
Id. at 991.
8. Gorham v. United States, 389 A.2d 401, 403-04 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
Gorham's case was consolidated with the cases of other defendants at trial and on
appeal. Chester Williams was the only other defendant to note an appeal from the trial
conviction. Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 403 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
A panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued a decision in Franklin
v. United States, No. 5960 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973). The court sitting en banc vacated that
decision sua sponte, and consolidated the appeals of Gorham and Williams with Franklin's
for reargument before the court sitting en banc. Franklin v. United States, 339 A.2d 898,
401, 403 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
9. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-402(a) (1973): "It shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess ... any narcotic drug .. 2
But see Gorham v. United States, 939 A.2d 401, 433 & n.26 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975),
wherein Justices Fickling and Kern noted in dissent that "Congress has not specifically
provided that addiction shall not be an affirmative defense to a charge of possessing
illicit narcotics or any other offense."
10. The purpose of sections 24-601 to 24-611 is to protect the health and safety
of the people of the District of Columbia from the menace of drug addiction
and to afford an opportunity to the drug user for rehabilitation. The Con-
gress intends that Federal Criminal laws shall be enforced against drug users
as well as other persons, and [the Act] shall not be used to substitute treat-
ment for punishment in cases of crime committed by drug users.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-601 (1973), as cited in Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 407-08
(D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (emphasis by the court).
But see Gorham, supra, at 435 where Justices Fickling and Kern noted in dissent
that the words "shall be enforced" as used in this statute denote the intent of Congress
to arrest and prosecute drug addicts which is "not synonymous with conviction." This
would be consistent with the appellant's attempt to raise mens rea as an affirmative de-
fense.
If the defense were recognized, addicts would still be criminally punished for their
crimes, other than those which are inherent in addiction, see Brief for Appellants Gorham
and Williams, quoted in part in note 6 supra.
11. The community provides the addict with the income he needs to support his addiction.
This income is provided for the addict in two ways:
1) directly through street crime, or, 2) by the sale of small amounts of drugs
to other addicts. . . . Thus the addict who cannot support his habit through
legal means contributes to the misery of the community in two distinct ways:
through the commission of crime against person or property or through per-
petration, if not enlargement, of the addict population.
Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 410-11 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
12. The "Narcotics Diversion Project" (1974) of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia makes such provisions. Id. at 412 & n.42.
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sistent with concepts of elemental justice. Gorham v. United States,
339 A.2d 401 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a
theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent
confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong
and choosing freely to do wrong. 18
Mens rea,"4 the mental factor necessary for criminality,1 5 has
been derived entirely from the case law.16 Mens rea has varied
with changes in the concepts and objectives which underlie criminal
justice." "[T]he constant reexamination and readjustment of the
concept of mens rea and its application to specific cases is one of
the basic duties of a judge." Is A judge, it has been noted, uses
mens rea to fill in "the open spaces in the law."1 9 American courts
have used the mens rea concept to modify broad and general
statutes by the recognition of the mens rea defense in such instances
as: mental disease or defect, 20 compulsion-duress, 2' alcohol depen-
dence, 22 and kleptomania.
2 3
The defense of lack of mens rea for a heroin addict's personal
possession of heroin was first considered in depth in Castle v. United
States.24 The defendant in that case asserted that he was compelled
13. Pound, Introduction to SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927), as quoted in Moris-
sette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952).
14. The original maxim was: "actus non factt reum, nisi mens sit rea" (an act does not
make [the doer of It] guilty, unless the mind be guilty). CovE, THIRD INSTrTE* 6, *56,
0107, as cited in Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 430 kD.C. Ct. App. 1975) (Fick-
ling, Kern, JJ., dissenting) (court's translation).
15. The case of Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) concerns
only crimes that are not strict liability crimes -. e., crimes that require as a necessary
element a certain state of mind, not crimes which impose liability without fault. See cases
cited in notes 1 and 2 aupra.
16. United States v. Gorham, 339 A.2d 401, 431 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (Fickling, Kern,
JJ., dissenting).
17. Id.
The doctrine of actus reus, mens rea, Insanity, mistake, justification, and
duress have historically provided the tools for constantly shifting adjust-
ment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and
changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of
man.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
18. United States v. Gorham, 339 A.2d 401, 436 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (Fickling, Kern,
JJ., dissenting).
19. Id., quoting B. CARDozo, THE NATUE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 112-13 (Yale paper-
back ed., 1921).
20. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
21. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Martin v. State, 81 Ala
App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 (1944).
22. Easter v. Dist. of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; State v. Fearon, 283
Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720 (1969).
23. State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N.W. 503 (1901). See also Allen v. United
States, 150 U.S. 551 (1893) (infancy); Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457, 1 S.W.
731 (1886) (infancy) ; People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943) (epi-
lepsy and unconsciousness); Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) (epi-
lepsy and unconsciousness) ; Pribble v. People, 49 Colo. 210, 112 P. 220 (1910) (the effect
of medication) ; Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. R. 213 (1879) (sleepwalking)
State v. RIppy, 104 N.C. 752, 10 S.E. 259 (1889) (involuntary intoxication).
24. 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929, 953 (1965), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 915 (1967),
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to use and possess heroin to prevent the major withdrawal symp-
toms that accompany a heroin addict's termination of heroin use.
25
The defense was called "pharmacological duress," and was based
on the postulate that "[a]n act committed under compulsion,
such as apprehension of serious and immediate bodily harm is in-
voluntary and, therefore, not criminal .... ,,28 The court recognized
the plausibility of the defense 27 but did not reach it on its merits
because the jury instructions originally submitted by defendant's
counsel at trial were not in the correct form, and no supplemental
jury instruction requests were made after the original instructions
were rejected, nor was there any objection made to the charge
as given to the jury.
28
In Watson v. United States2 9 the possibility of the lack of mens
rea defense was recognized in the prosecution of an addict for pos-
session of heroin.30 Here again, the court did not reach the merits
of the defense, due to an insufficiency in the trial record.31 In Wat-
son a distinction was made between a trafficking addict and a non-
trafficking addict.3 2 A trafficking addict, the court noted, is an ad-
dict who engages in such acts as the trading, importation and dis-
tribution of heroin, while a non-trafficking addict is an addict who
possesses heroin for personal use.33 If the defense were recognized,
the court suggested, it would be available only to the non-trafficking
addict, and not the trafficking addict.3 4 The court also suggested a
procedure for defendants to utilize in raising the defense in future
cases.
3 5
In United States v. Ashton8 the court, relying on Watson,",
dismissed an indictment against an addict because there was in-
sufficient proof to show the defendant was a trafficking addict.38 The
The mens rea defense was dismissed without discussion by the majority in Lloyd
v. United States, 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965).
25. 347 F.2d 492, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 494, quoting Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 976 & n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
27. 347 F.2d 492, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dictum).
28. Id. at 495.
29. 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Mr. 1970).
30. Id. at 452-54 (dictum).
31. At the trial the defendant brought his defense solely within the format of an In-
sanity defense. On appeal the court felt that the evidence produced by this defendant In
support of an insanity defense did not meet the heavy burden of proof required for the
lack of mens rea defense. Id. at 451.
32. Id. at 452-53 & n.9. The only previous distinction drawn was between addicts and
non-addicts. Id.
33. Id. at 453 n.9.
84. Id. at 454.
35. The court suggested that the primary attack be with a motion to dismiss the
charges because the possession of heroin under such circumstances has not been made
criminal, with an alternative claim that the statute violates the eighth amendment's pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 453-54.
36. 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970).
37. 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum).
38. 317 F. Supp. 860, 862 (D.D.C. 1970). Both common law me s rea grounds and the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment were relied upon
by the court in It's holding. Id.
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court in Ashton recognized the need for clarification of the traf-
ficking, non-trafficking addict distinction, because:
It is a matter of common knowledge that most addicts sell
narcotics from time to time to finance their habit, or trade
heroin for the favor of food or lodging, or give drugs to
friends facing withdrawal. 9
In United States v. Lindsey,40 the court ruled that although the
common law defense of lack of mens rea was available to a non-traf-
ficking addict charged with possession, 41 the defendant in that case
failed to prove that he was an addict and therefore did not qualify
for the defense.
42
In the case of United States v. Moore,4 3 a 5-4 circuit court de-
cision,4 4 a mens rea defense was rejected in a prosecution of an ad-
dict for possession of heroin.45 The court in Moore believed there
to be sufficient evidence in that case to show that the defendant
was a trafficking addict, but went on to state that the conviction
would be sustained even if he were a non-trafficking addict.4 6 The
majority introduced a mathematical concept of self-control to in-
dicate when the loss of self-control or free will would be available
to the defendant with a mens rea defense.4 7 Under this concept,
a loss of self-control occurs when the amount of physical craving
for a substance such as heroin exceeds a person's strength of char-
acter or moral standards.4 8 Applying this reasoning, the Moore ma-
jority concluded that a person who commits a more serious crime
to feed his habit has less self-control than does the addict who con-
fines his crime to personal possession of the drug.4 9 The court,
therefore, rejected the defense of a lack of mens rea for a heroin
addict's possession of heroin because the concept of mens rea would
apply to more serious crimes as well as the crime of possession.
0
The court in Moore recognized two goals in dealing with her-
oin addicts.51 The first was rehabilitation which, the court admitted,
39. Id. at 862.
40. 324 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1971), modified, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 59-60.
42. Id. at 60. The court stated:
The defendant on cross-examination indicated that on the 14th of August when
he was arrested he had simply made up his mind to get high so that he could
watch the Redskins football game.
43. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
44. Three justices found the defense to be invalid, and two others voted to affirm the
conviction without reaching the merits of the defense. Justices Wright, Tamn, Robinson
and Chief Justice Bazelon voted In dissent to recognize the defense. Id. at 1140.
45. Id. at 1144.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1145.
48. Id. Physical craving and moral standards or strength of character were not defined
by the court.
49. Id. at 1146.
50. Id. at 1146-48.
51. Id. at 1157.
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might be served by allowing the defense of lack of mens rea for a
addict's possession of heroin for personal use.52 The second goal
was the complete elimination of the addictive substance from socie-
ty, which, the court noted, is best served by non-recognition of the
defense, thereby giving to the police prosecutorial discretion to en-
able them to enlist addicts to ferret out wholesalers.53 The court
also felt that the possible punishment for possession would persuade
some addicts to undertake rehabilitation.5
Alcohol, like heroin, is a drug which produces addiction in many
of the people who use it. 5 Alcohol, unlike heroin, is legally pos.
sessable by adults, whereas the possession of heroin is generally
illegal under all circumstances.55
A defense of lack of mens rea, similar to the one proposed in
Gorham, has been recognized for a chronic alcoholic 57 convicted of
public intoxication.
5 8
In Driver v. Hinnant59 the court relied exclusively on the eighth
amendment's 60 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
in holding that a chronic alcoholic could not be convicted and sen-
tenced for being drunk in a public place.6' The court in that case
appeared to recognize the possibility of a common law mens rea
defense in stating:
Although his [the defendant's] misdoing objectively
comprises the physical elements of a crime, nevertheless
no crime has been perpetrated because the conduct was neith-
er actuated by an evil intent nor accompanied with a con-
sciousness of wrongdoing, indispensible ingredients of a
crime .
2
In Easter v. District of Columbia"3 a common law mens rea
defense was specifically relied upon by the court in a prosecution




55. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
56. Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 409 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
57. A chronic alcoholic has been defined as "a person who is powerless to stop drinking
and whose drinking seriously alters his normal living pattern." Driver v. Hinnant, 356
F.2d 761, 763 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1966), quoting PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, ALcoHoIsm (Public
Health Service Pub. No. 730).
D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-522 (1973) provides:
(1) The term "chronic alcoholic" means any person who chronically and ha-
bitually uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that (A) they injure his health
or interfere with his social or economic functioning, or (B) he has lost the
power of self control with respect to the use of such beverages.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
59. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
60. U.S. CONET. amend. VIII.
61. 356 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1966).
62. Id. at 764 (dictum), citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952).
63. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
64. Id. at 51-4.
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An essential element of criminal responsibility is the ability
to avoid the conduct specified in the definition of the crime.
• . . To be guilty of the crime a person must engage respon-
sibly in the action .... 65
The fact that alcoholism originally begins with an initially volun-
tary act or series of acts, the Easter court noted, does not make the
later developed alcoholism criminal6s The court recognized the
defense only for an alcohol addict-an involuntary drinker, and not
for the voluntary drinker.6 7 The court noted that the mens rea de-
fense was based on the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility,
which is separate and distinct from a defense based upon the defen-
dant's affliction with any mental disease or defect. 68
Although the appellant in Gorham relied upon the Easter ration-
ale in asserting his mens rea defense,69 the majority rejected such
a defense by distinguishing between the two drugs at issue: alco-
hol and heroin. Alcohol, although regulated, is legal, while the pos-
session of heroin is illegal.7 0 Alcohol, the court noted, is less ad-
dicting and safer for the average individual to experiment with. 1
Finally, alcohol is simply used too widely to seriously consider pro-
hibition, while heroin is still "exotic," and as such is easier to
control.
7 2
The majority's distinctions appear to center more on the nature
of the drug rather than on the state of the person who is addicted
to it. It has been noted that "[t]he law looks to the immediate,
and not to the remote cause; to the actual state of the party, and
not to the causes, which remotely produced it. . "...73 The majority
seems therefore to have overlooked the most crucial factors in-
volved in the problem of heroin addiction: the addict's physical and
mental state.
The heroin addiction problem in North Dakota does not appear
to be as severe as the problem of heroin addiction in the District of
Columbia.7 4 Nevertheless, North Dakota cannot completely ignore
this rapidly increasing problem.
The North Dakota statute75 prohibiting the possession of heroin
65. Id. at 52.
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id. at 55 n.8.
69. 339 A,2d 401, 408 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
70. Id. at 409.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913, 914 (No. 14,993) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828).
74. (W]ithin the Model Cities area of the District of Columbia, it is estimated
that more than a third of all men between the ages of 20 and 24, and almost
a quarter of those between 15 and 19, are addicted to heroin.
United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1227 & n.120 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, Bazelon,
Tamm, and Robinson, JJ., dissenting).
75. N.D. CENT'. CoDE § 19-03.1-23(3) (Supp. 1975).
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is not a strict liability statute which would impose liability regard-
less of the existence of "fault." The North Dakota statute76 requires
willful possession of heroin. 77 Since there appears to be no judicial
precedent on point in North Dakota, North Dakota courts may, it
appears, be able to recognize the common law defense of a lack of
mens rea as it was proposed in Gorham.
A defense such as that proposed by the appellant in Gorham
would not amount to a legalization of heroin. 78 Civil commitment
would still be available for the courts to impose on non-trafficking
addict possessors of the drug. 79 Such a defense would be available
only for those acts of a non-trafficking addict which are inseparable
from the disease itself and which inflict no direct harm on society. 0
Heroin addiction has been labeled as the most intensive form
of drug dependence, much more severe than alcohol addiction.8 ' To
punish a non-trafficking addict for possession of heroin would at-
tribute to the addict an ability he may not have: the abillity to
choose to possess or not to possess heroin.
82
When disease [dipsomania] is the propelling, uncontrollable
power, the man is as innocent as the weapon; the mental
and moral elements are as guiltless as the material. If his
mental, moral and bodily strength is subjugated and pressed
to an involuntary service, it is immaterial whether it is done
by his disease or by another man, or a brute, or any physi-
cal force of art or nature set in operation without any fault
on his part. If a man knowing the difference between right
and wrong, but deprived by either of those agencies of the
power to choose between them, is punished, he is punished
for his inability to make the choice-he is punished for in-
capacity; and that is the very thing for which the law says
he shall not be punished. He might as well be punished for
an incapacity to distinguish right from wrong, as for an
incapacity to resist mental disease which forces upon him
its choice of the wrong.
8 3
During the last twenty years the use of abusable drugs has
shown an increase of epidemic proportions, despite the vigorous pro-
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2) (Supp. 1975).
77. Id.
78. See Brief for Appellants Gorham and Williams, quoted in part In note 6 supra.
79. Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 439 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975). (Fickling, Kern,
JJ., dissenting).
80. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, Bazelon,
Tamm, and Robinson, JJ., dissenting).
The defense would cover acts such as purchase, receipt, possession for personal use,
and possession of paraphernalia for personal use. Id.
81. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION EXPERT CoMMITTEE ON ALCOHOL, FIRST REPORT, (World
Health Organization Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 84 at 10-11, 1954), cited in Moore v. United
States, 486 F.2d 1139, 1242 & n.192 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, Bazelon, Tamm, and Robin-
son, JJ., dissenting).
82. The same rationale would apply in punishing an addict for other crimes inseparable
from heroin addiction, supra note 80.
83. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 6 Am. R. 533, 584-85 (1870) (J. Doe, dissenting).
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secution of addicts.84 The American Bar Association's committee on
Crime Prevention and Control has found that:
The demand [for heroin] is created not by economic con-
siderations but by an insatiable physiological craving of the
addicts, who must obtain large and frequent doses of heroin
to maintain a semblance of physical normality. As a result,
the addicts' incessant efforts to obtain heroin are undeterred
by the threat of harsh punishment for illegal drug possession
or by the black market's exorbitant prices.8 5
The majority in Gorham has not taken advantage of an oppor-
tunity to apply the mens rea concept to the problem of heroin ad-
diction. Unfortunately, the Gorham decision has thus contributed
little towards the solution of a growing heroin problem.
CARL W. SCHUETTPELZ
84. Gorham v. United States, 839 A.2d 401, 437 & n.40 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (Fickling,
Kern, JJ., dissenting).
85. A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON URBAN CRIME 26 (1972), a.s cited in Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 437-38 &
n.41 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (Fickling, Kern, JJ., dissenting).

